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Will the Arab Spring Succeed
in Bringing Bread, Freedom,
and Dignity?
Sandra Popiden
Tunisia has a good chance to become a democratic, peaceful, and stable state, and a good
example for the whole region. However, this development will be at risk, if the government
does not meet the population’s high expectations to find a quick solution for the social
problems… The most important task is to find a solution to the socio-economic problems…
[The people] want jobs, houses and a better future. And all of them demand to change
everything at once.
Tunisian Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali, 2012.

E

conomic discontent fueled the political
dissatisfaction that erupted in the Arab Spring
uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and
Yemen in 2011. Demonstrators blamed repressive
authoritarian governments for slow economic growth,
increasing poverty and social inequality, high youth
unemployment and rampant corruption. Alongside
demands for increased political freedom, greater
participation in politics, and an end to repression were
calls for economic freedom and improved well-being.
The uprisings, which spawned democracy in Tunisia,
Egypt, and Libya, continue to reverberate across the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) by opening
up previously closed public spaces to wider popular
participation in national debates over the prospects
for democracy in Arab countries. Crucial to these
prospects is tangible economic progress.
The most urgent challenge that the
newly elected leaders face, therefore,
is the formulation of policies that will
foster economic growth and improve
living standards. As the experience
of new democracies across the world
over the past thirty years shows, tangible economic progress improves the
likelihood of successful democratic
transitions and endows otherwise
fragile young democracies with legitimacy and popular support essential
for their survival.
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What do the Protesters
Want?
In the five years prior to the 2011 Arab
Spring uprisings, Arab Barometer
surveys found widespread agreement
among the Arab public that the most
important problems in the region
related to the economy, corruption and
authoritarianism (http://www.arabbarometer.org/). The surveys revealed
vividly that the Arab public views its
declining economic well-being and the
continued authoritarian rule in their

countries as inextricably linked. It is,
therefore, not surprising that the people
who spearheaded the Arab Spring
uprisings demanded the replacement of
ossified and unresponsive authoritarian
regimes with transparent and accountable democratic governments as the
means to deal with their own deteriorating well-being.
The food shortages and price shocks
experienced since 2008, such as the
32% increase in food prices between
2010 and 2011, have continued even
after the uprisings. Arab countries’
high dependence on food imports
and declining remittances due to the
global recession have only amplified
these price shocks. For example, in a
Gallup poll conducted in the spring of
2011, nearly half the survey respondents
in Egypt expressed difficulty in meeting their needs. Their number one
concern was price inf lation, especially the cost of food, oil and sugar.
Moreover, in a clear ref lection of the
decline in economic well-being,
53% of Egyptian respondents said that
economic conditions in their cities are
worsening, a figure twice as high as it
was in the previous year (http://www.
gallup.com/poll/148133/egypt-tahrirtransition.aspx).
The economic crisis is likely to be
most politically destabilizing in Yemen,
the least-developed Arab country.
According to World Food Program
spokesperson, Emilia Casella, fuel
prices on the black market have risen
500% since January 2011. Prices of
staple foods such as bread, f lour,
sugar and milk have also increased by
40–60%. The food crisis in Yemen
(as one report in the 14 March 2012
Guardian noted) has resulted in five
million people (22% of the population)
requiring emergency food aid; another
five million are experiencing moderate food insecurity. Clearly, people in
MENA countries in transition are still
waiting for the economic improvements they hoped their political revolutions would bring.
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countries generally, and for the emergence and survival of new and fragile
democracies specifically.

One of the most pressing challenges in
MENA stems from the fact that Arab
youth (15-24 years) comprise 20% of
the region’s total population, but 30%
of its working-age population. More
critically, however, 25% of the Arab
youth are unemployed, which is not
only the highest rate of unemployment
in the world but more than twice as
high as the 11% unemployment rate
across MENA (see Table 1). This
youth bulge has serious economic
and political implications for Arab

The World Bank estimates that the
costs of youth unemployment to the
region amount to $50 billion annually.
Unemployment rates of 30-40 % are
most commonly found among females
and the university educated. The key
to the region’s economic success is
incorporating the roughly 80 million
young people into the labor force. This
will restore the path to social mobility
that has been blocked and aid in longterm projects such as improving health
and education outcomes. Bolstering

private-sector opportunities is essential
to relieving the pressure on the overburdened public sector and countering the brain-drain emigration trends
found among the most educated.
An imperative in Arab countries,
therefore, is to engage this generationin-waiting as productive members of
society. Sound policymaking and
skillful management of the economy
are essential to such efforts. Reforms
are needed to train the youth and give
them the marketable skills that private employers require. Labor markets
and banking institutions also need
to be reformed so that small business

Table 1 – The Youth Bulge and Its Economic Implications in MENA
Youth as %
of Total
Population

Youth as % of
Working Age
Population

Youth
Unemployment
Rate (%)

Total
Unemployment
Rate (%)

Algeria

23.00

34.00

45.60

10.00

Bahrain

15.00

22.00

20.70

5.00

Egypt

21.00

34.00

25.80

8.00

Iraq

20.00

36.00

45.30

30.00

Jordan

20.00

33.00

38.90

11.00

Kuwait

15.00

21.00

23.30

3.00

Lebanon

18.00

29.00

21.30

12.00

Libya

23.00

34.00

27.30

7.00

Morocco

18.00

32.00

15.70

10.00

Oman

21.00

33.00

19.60

7.00

Qatar

14.00

18.00

17.00

1.00

Saudi Arabia

19.00

31.00

15.90

5.00

Syria

23.00

38.00

19.80

21.00

Tunisia

21.00

31.00

26.50

14.00

UAE

17.00

23.00

6.30

2.00

Yemen

21.00

42.00

33.10

25.00

West Bank/Gaza

19.00

38.00

25.13

10.69

Mean

19.57

31.12

25.13

10.69

Countries

Source: Ragui Assaad and Farzaneh Roudi-Fahimi, “Youth in the Middle East and North Africa: Demographic Opportunity or Challenge?” (Washington, DC:
Population Reference Bureau, 2007) 3; Jad Chaaban, “Job Creation in the Arab Economies: Navigating Through Difficult Waters” Arab Human Development
Research Paper Series (New York: UNDP Regional Bureau of Arab States, 2010) 21.
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and potential entrepreneurs can have
f lexibility in hiring and much-needed
access to physical capital. The hesitation
of new leaders to tackle the economic
aspects of transition is a risky do-nothing strategy. The continued presence
of large numbers of educated, unemployed and discontented youth does not
bode well for the region’s long-term
political stability.

Economic Transformation
is Crucial to Designing a
New Order
In order to generate the stabilizing
effects of economic growth, employment and development, the pioneers
of democracy in Arab countries face

entrenched interests in the economy,
which is estimated to be about 30%.
The outcome of this political standoff
will affect the ability of the moderate
Islamist Freedom and Justice Party to
implement its pro-business and anticorruption platform as well as its social
policies targeting Egypt’s poverty and
inequality problems.
Similarly, Tunisia, which was viewed
by many as the economic miracle of
the Arab world, also faces problems in
overcoming the entrenched obstacles to
reform. A key challenge for the coalition government led by the moderate
Islamist party, Ennahda, is to divest “the
family” or “godfathers of Tunis” who
seek to protect their interests in the

25% of the Arab youth are
unemployed, which is not only
the highest in the world but more
than twice as high as the 11%
unemployment rate across MENA.
two interrelated problems. The first is
how to guard against potential coups
and counter-revolutions and the second
is how to reduce the power of those
who oppose job-creating economic
reforms. Egypt, the most populous
country in the Arab world, has one of
the highest rates of youth unemployment. It is the second-largest Arab
economy, but 40% of its population
makes a living with less than $2 a day.
President Mohamed Morsi faces two
politically sensitive tasks: getting the
military to return to the barracks; and
separating them from their commanding position over the economy. This is
likely to be a difficult power struggle,
as the military has dominated politics
for decades. Complicating this transition is the level of the military’s deeply
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economy. In one Wikileaks document,
a confidential assessment by the United
States Ambassador to Tunisia asserted
that half of all commercial elites in
the country were related to the Ben
Ali family. Dissolving these patronage
networks is fundamental to achieving good governance and establishing
new partnerships with independent
entrepreneurs. Such actions would also
signal to investors that the government
is committed to creating competitive
and transparent business conditions.
Ultimately, these efforts are crucial to
revitalizing the economy and improving the well-being of the population.
To date, Tunisia has shown the most
promise in achieving both political and
economic transformations. Toppling
the dictator was only the beginning. In
order to stabilize country and safeguard

the democratic goals of the revolution, widespread economic growth and
development are required.
For MENA countries in transition, two
immediate challenges are to restore
investor confidence and create a climate
that will allow for the revival of industries, such as tourism. Over the long
term, governments also face difficulties
in eradicating corruption and promoting pro-market economic policies with
strong welfare components. Although
it has been a politically appealing
choice in the region to expand populist subsidies, this is ultimately not an
economically viable long-term solution. In order for the Arab Spring to
be considered a success, youth must be
integrated into the political and socioeconomic systems. This can only be
accomplished if the countries in transition participate more fully in the global
economy. Globalized countries grow
more quickly than do those with closed
economies. Thus, policies that facilitate
international trade and investment,
such as reducing protectionism, creating special economic zones, cutting
customs costs and diversifying exports,
are likely to measurably increase economic growth and development.
Beyond diplomatic statements, western
countries can signal their support for
the democratization movements by
working toward establishing free trade
agreements and economic partnerships.
At this pivotal moment in history, a
progressive partnership between Arab
and western countries based on creative leadership is required to fulfill the
aspirations of the Arab Spring.
Sandra Popiden is Assistant Professor
in the Department of Political Science.
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